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Closing the Door on Subjective Reasonableness:
Evaluating Police-Created Exigencies and the
Issues with the Doctrinal Shift to Objectivity in
Warrantless Searches
Gordon L. Mowen, H'
INTRODUCTION
T HE requirement set forth by the Fourth Amendment that police must
obtain a warrant prior to a search and seizure has been diminished
by judicially created exceptions One such exception is the exigent
circumstances doctrine.3 This exception allows police to enter a home
without a warrant based on a compelling need to immediately conduct
a search.4 Until 2011, the federal circuits were split on how to apply this
warrantless entry doctrine, each employing various tests and standards.'
In King v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Kentucky attempted to
I JD expected May 2013, University of Kentucky College of Law; BA in Psychology,
University of Louisville, 2010.
2 Compare U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."), and
Brigham City v. Stewart, 547 U.S. 398,403 (2oo6) ("Under the Fourth Amendment, searches
and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable."), with Mincey
v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978) (showing that an exception to the warrant requirement of the
Fourth Amendment is an exigent circumstance), and United States v. Simmons, 66i F3 d 151
(2d Cir. 2o i) (When "the exigencies of [a] situation make the needs of law enforcement so
compelling that a warrantless search is objectively reasonable" no warrant is needed to enter
the home).
3 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573,586-88 (980).
4 See, e.g., Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 559 (2004); United States v. Bank, 540 U.S. 31,
40 (2003); Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 331-32 (2001); Minnesota v. Olsen, 495 U.S. 91,
I00(1990).
5 See Simmons, 66I E3d 151 (2d Cit. 2011) (holding that an objective standard should be
employed in measuring exigent circumstances and police action); United States v. Mowatt,
513 E 3 d 395 (4th Cir. 2008) (using a reasonably foreseeable, subjective approach); United
States v. Coles, 437 F3d 361, 367-70 (3d Cit. 2006) (focusing on the reasonableness of police
actions to determine if exigent circumstances exist); United States v. Williams, 354 F.3 d 497,
504-05 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that police cannot create exigent circumstances even when
they have probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed); Ewolski v. City of
Brunswick, 287 E3d 492,504 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that a search is invalid if police deliber-
ately create the exigency to avoid the warrant requirement).
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carve out an exception to the exigent circumstances doctrine, which set
forth the requirement that police officers could not create the exigency and
then rely on it to enter without first obtaining a warrant.6 In response to a
perceived growing tension among the circuits, the United States Supreme
Court reviewed King v. Commonwealth (King I) in Kentucky v. King' (King II)
to instruct courts as to how to properly evaluate police-created exigent
circumstances.
In King I, the Supreme Court created a new test for evaluating police-
created exigent circumstances, snuffed out at least five different tests
among federal and state courts, overruled a unanimous Kentucky Supreme
Court decision, and loosened the tight grip the Court had employed on
police-created exigencies in the past.8 The result was a weakening of the
Fourth Amendment, allowing bad-faith intent for warrantless entries,
causing confusion among the circuits, and giving an unprecedented amount
of discretion to police officers. 9 This new test, satisfying only a minority of
the prevailing views of the various exigency doctrines, has been left to the
federal district and state courts to define and apply because the United States
Supreme Court laid down what the test should be, but then remanded the
case back to Kentucky without applying it. Like an incomplete thought,
the Supreme Court told lower courts that exigent circumstances must
be objectively gauged but provided no tools or instructions with which
to analyze these issues. Thus, King II stopped short of truly solving the
dilemma in this doctrine. Ultimately, what is not known is how this test
truly affects warrantless entry based on the exigent circumstance exception
while what is known is that decades of case law has been abrogated, leaving
the courts to flounder as they attempt to grasp this new perspective on
police-created exigencies. Perhaps even more damaging than the lack of
direction given by the Supreme Court in its decision is the reality that the
Fourth Amendment safeguard against warrantless entries based on exigent
6 King v. Commonwealth (King 1), 302 S.W.3d 649,655 (Ky. 2010).
7 Kentucky v. King (King l), 131 S. Ct. 1849 (2011 ).
8 See, e.g., Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740,753 (t984) ("[N]o exigency is created simply
because there is probable cause to believe that a serious crime has been committed."); Pay-
ton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587-88 (1980) ("[A]bsent exigent circumstances, a warrantless
[search for evidence] is unconstitutional even when a felony has been committed and there
is probable cause to believe that incriminating evidence will be found within."); Taylor v.
United States, 286 U.S. i, 6 (1932) ("Prohibition officers may rely on a distinctive odor [of
whiskey] as a physical fact indicative of possible crime; but its presence alone does not strip
the owner of a building of constitutional guarantees ... against unreasonable search.").
9 See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 342 (2009) (quoting McDonald v. United States, 335
U.S. 451,455-56 (1948)) (stating that privacy and security in one's home, the "central concern
underlying the Fourth Amendment," is "too precious to entrust to the discretion of those
whose job is the detection of crime and the arrest of criminals").
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circumstances was weakened as a result of King 11,1° and it appears that
courts are applying this new test in varying degrees.
This note will explain that the objective standard within the police-
created exigency exception to the doctrine of exigent circumstances created
in King II, supported only by one circuit," is contrary to the fundamental
notion that searches are unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment
barring very limited exceptions and is currently being-and will continue
to be-misconstrued among the circuits based on the regional histories of
this doctrine.12 King 11 was supposed to resolve a split among the courts,
but rather, as this note will highlight, it shifted the doctrinal safeguards to
grant police more discretion and created a rift in evaluating police-created
exigencies, forcing courts to choose between core underlying Fourth
Amendment principles and a surprising Supreme Court decision. 3
This note is divided into seven parts. Part I outlines the power
behind the Fourth Amendment with a particular emphasis on the various
exceptions to the warrant requirement that courts have developed through
decades of meticulous jurisprudence. This will include a historical review of
the doctrinal components of exigent circumstances that existed up to King
II. Part II focuses on King I, highlighting the Kentucky Supreme Court's
unanimous decision regarding the application of the exigent circumstances
doctrine, providing the factual background to the suppression issues at
the trial level, and comparing the Kentucky Appeals Court decision with
that of the Kentucky Supreme Court. This will serve to place the legal
issue that was "resolved" by the United States Supreme Court in its proper
context. Part III will discuss and explain the circuit split as it existed prior
to King II, foreshadow the various ways in which the circuits will begin
applying the tempest holding of King H, and enumerate the authority and
rationale employed in the use of these doctrinal tests. Part IV will explain
Kentucky's unanimous decision in Kingl, which was overturned in KingI.
io SeeKingll, 131 S. Ct. at 1864 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
i1 See United States v. MacDonald, 916 F.2d 766, 772 (2d Cir. 199o); King l, 302 S.W.3d
649, 656 (Ky. 2010) ("The Second Circuit appears to give the most deference to law enforce-
ment....").
12 This is not the first time that the power of the Fourth Amendment has been ques-
tioned and changed abruptly by the Supreme Court. See generally Alfredo Garcia, Toward an
Integrated Vision of Criminal Procedural Rights: A Counter to Judicial and Academic Nihilism, 77
MARQ. L. REV. 1, 2 (1993) (citing Bruce A. Green, "Power Not Reason": Justice Marshall's Vale-
dictory and the Fourth Amendment in the Supreme Court's I99O Term, 70 N.C. L. REv. 373 (1992))
(pointing out that the Supreme Court has "employed interpretive principle, policy, and prec-
edent in an inconsistent fashion to yield a restrictive construction of the Fourth Amendment
in every case").
13 See Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481 (1965) (stating that the Fourth Amendment is
designed to protect against "the worst instrument of arbitrary power, the most destructive of [I
liberty, and the fundamental principles of law .. "); see also Garcia, supra note 12, at 8 (noting
that the Fourth Amendment is a basic freedom and that misuse of warrants is what sparked
the American Revolution).
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Part V will address the route by which King I became King II through an
analysis of the petition for certiorari, amicus brief, and respondent filings.
Part VI will address the Supreme Court's reaction to King I in King II.
This note concludes with Part VII, an analysis that meshes the doctrinal
components of the test created by the Supreme Court in King 11 with
the tests used in the various circuits with the goal of finding what the
Supreme Court may have intrinsically been relying on when it created this
objectively-based test. Ultimately, this note cautions against the use of a
purely objective standard and advocates that the proper way to interpret
this standard, as reflected in recent federal circuit and district decisions,
is a measure that is partially subjective while retaining a proper level of
objective inquiry. The analysis discusses the effects of the objective
doctrine, pointing out potential discretionary issues substantiated by Justice
Ginsburg's dissent. At the conclusion of this piece, this note forecasts the
future of "exigent circumstances" and points out what types of issues will
arise from increasing police discretion.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL SAFEGUARDS
A. The Fourth Amendment as an Affirmative Limitation on the Authority of Any
Government Agent to Intrude Upon the Personal Rights of an Individual
The power of the government to search, seize, and arrest is an incredible
power.14 The text of the Fourth Amendment proscribes limitations to this
power i" and is a safeguard against unreasonable search and seizures.
16
Viewed this way, the Fourth Amendment is a textual barrier mounted
between individual rights and governmental authority. 7 A search occurs
when a person expects privacy in the thing being searched and society
believes that expectation is reasonable." At this point, and barring any
exception, the Fourth Amendment requires that police must obtain a
14 See MICHAEL PALMIOTTO, CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 30 (Michael Palmiotto et al. eds.,
3d ed. 2004).
15 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated ....
(emphasis added).
16 See King !!, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011) (Under the Fourth Amendment, "searches and
seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable") (citing Brigham
City v. Stewart, 547 U.S. 398,403 (2006)).
17 Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 637 (1896) (Field, J., dissenting) (explaining that there
has been a "long struggle between the opposing forces of the spirit of individual liberty on the
one hand and the collective power of the State on the other").
18 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Contra United States v. Vega, 221 F3d 789,
798 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that an expectation of privacy in a residence is subjective).
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search warrant, 19 and this warrant must be supported by probable cause."
For this reason, the Fourth Amendment sets forth a crucial check on the
awesome power of the government to intrude upon people's privacy-it is
an affirmative limitation."1 Over the years, courts have developed a number
of exceptions to the warrant requirement." These exceptions include:
consent,23 plain view, 4 motor vehicles
5 search incident to lawful arrest, 6
protective sweeps, 7 companion pat-downs," and exigent circumstances. 9
In the event that a warrantless search is conducted without a valid
exception, the general remedy is evidence suppression at trial.
3
1
B. How Exigent Circumstances Work
Exigent circumstances overcome the presumption that warrantless
searches are unreasonable when the exigencies of the situation "make
the needs of law enforcement so compelling that a warrantless search is
objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment."'" This doctrine
allows police to enter a home without obtaining a warrant, effectively
sidestepping Fourth Amendment protections.32 However, in determining
19 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2o King 11, 131 S. Ct. at 1856 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. IV).
21 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 ("The Fourth Amendment protects people .... ). See generally
Garcia, supra note 12, at 1-2 (noting that the scope of criminal procedural rights stems from
safeguards in the "value-laden" Bill of Rights).
22 These exceptions are not absolute and are subject to judicial review. See Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 461 (1971 ) (holding that exceptions to the warrant requirement
are not talismans precluding further judicial inquiry whenever they are invoked); Jones v.
United States, 357 U.S. 493,499 (1958) (noting that exceptions to the warrant requirement are
"jealously and carefully drawn"); see also Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762 (1969) (quot-
ing United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (951)) ("The general requirement that a search
warrant be obtained is not lightly to be dispensed with, and the burden is on those seeking
[an] exemption [from the requirement] to show the need for it.
23 Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990).
24 Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (I99O).
25 Arizona v. Gant, 5S6 U.S. 332 (2009).
26 United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973).
27 United States v. Neal, No. i1-OZ8 Section: R(3), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS I o6io (E.D.
La. Sept. 28, 2011).
28 Owens v. Commonwealth, 291 S.W.3d 704, 708 (Ky. 2009) (citing United States v. Ber-
ryhill, 445 Fzd 1189, 1193 (9th Cir. 1971)).
29 KingHl, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1852 (201 1) (citing Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385,394 (1978))
(noting that one exception to the warrant requirement is exigent circumstances).
30 See United States. v. Chambers, 395 E3d 563 (6' h Cit. 2005) ("[Sluppression is required
of any items seized during [an unlawful] search.").
31 King!!, 113 S. Ct. at 1856 (citing Mincey, 437 U.S. at 394)).
32 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (198o) ("Absent exigent circumstances, the
threshold to a house may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant.").
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whether exigent circumstances exist to allow police officers entry into a
home without a warrant, courts have been split on how to measure this
exception.33 In fact, at one point, at least five different tests existed to
determine the validity of exigent circumstances among the federal circuits
and several other variations among state courts.34 To turn a disputed doctrine
into a tempest, some courts, including Kentucky state courts, carved out an
exception to this exception: the "police-created" exigency.
The police-created exigency doctrine holds that when police create or
manufacture an exigent circumstance, a warrantless search is not justified.35
Undeniably, this way of measuring whether a valid exigent circumstance
exists in a particular case depends on the intent of the police officers,
a subjective measure. The Fourth Circuit, Eighth Circuit, Arkansas
Supreme Court, and Kentucky Supreme Court have all gauged this idea by
considering whether it was foreseeable that the police actions would create
an exigency.36 This exigency is essentially an exception to an exception
and re-invokes the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. Prior to King
II, different jurisdictions did not agree on how to determine when police-
created the exigency impermissibly and whether or not this should negate
the warrantless exception.37
The United States Supreme Court took occasion to "solve" this
problem when it granted certiorari to hear King I. To understand how this
situation came to light, it is important to know the facts surrounding Hollis
King and what occurred on October 13, 2005 during a police operation near
his residence.
33 Compare United States v. Mowatt, 513 E3d 395,399 (4th Cir. zoo8) (using a subjective
measure), United States v. Coles, 437 F3d 361,367 (3d Cir. 2oo6) (focusing on police action),
Ewolski v. City of Brunswick, 287 E3d 492, 504 (6th Cir. 2002) (evaluating subjective police
conduct), and United States v. Rengifo, 858 E2d 8oo, 804 (ist Cir. 1988) (looking at bad faith
on part of police officer), with United States v. MacDonald, 916 E2d 766, 772 (2d Cir. 199o)
(exigencies must be objectively reasonable).
34 See Petition forWrit of Certiorari at i i, Kingll, 131 S. Ct. 1849 (No. 09-1272), 2010 U.S.
S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2o62 at 20.
35 King 1, 302 S.W.3d 649 (Ky. 2010).
36 See Mowatt, 513 E3d at 400-03; United States v. Duchi, 906 F.2d 1278, 1284-85 (8th
Cir. 199o); Mann v. State, 161 S.W.3 d 826, 834 (Ark. zoo6); Id. at 649-56..
37 See King 11, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1858-62(2011).
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II. THE STORY OF HOLLIS KING
A. Facts of King"
In 2005, police took part in a "controlled buy"39 in a parking lot next
to an apartment building.4° During the controlled buy, the suspect fled
on foot into the apartment complex. Through radio communication, two
police officers involved in the controlled buy heard that the suspect had
entered the breezeway of the apartment building.41 As the chasing police
officers entered the breezeway, they heard a door shut somewhere towards
the end, but did not know if it was a door on the left or the right side
of the breezeway. As they approached the midpoint of the breezeway,
they began to smell marijuana emanating from the right side door of
the apartment building. The police guessed that the fleeing suspect had
entered that apartment because of the odor of marijuana (the suspect had
in fact entered the door on the left).42 From there, the police knocked and
announced their presence and, after hearing movement inside and fearing
that evidence might be being destroyed, entered the apartment by kicking
in the door. Once inside the apartment, the police performed a protective
sweep and discovered marijuana and Hollis King. 3 King was indicted for
trafficking in a controlled substance (first degree), possession of marijuana,
and persistent felony offense (second degree).'
B. King s Procedural History and the Doctrine Created by King I
Prior to trial in the Fayette County-Circuit Court, King argued that the
entry was unlawful and, being unlawful, the evidence should be suppressed
pursuant to the Fourth Amendment. The motion to suppress was denied
38 A detailed account of the facts as found by the trial court and adopted by the appeals
court is being provided at this juncture because the Kentucky Supreme Court and United
States Supreme Court adopted these findings of fact.
39 This is a scenario where police officers purchase drugs from a suspected drug dealer
in an effort to bring trafficking charges against them. For a detailed discussion of controlled
buys and the related doctrine of entrapment see Morrow v. Commonwealth, 286 S.W.3d 206 (Ky.
2oo9), Wyattv. Commonwealth, 219 S.W.3d 751 (Ky. 2007), and Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 505.010
(LexisNexis 2008).
40 King v. Commonwealth, No. 2oo6-CA-oo2o33-MR, 2oo8 WL697629, at *i (Ky. Ct.
App. Mar. 14, 2oo8).
41 Id. at3.
42 This fact pattern is particularly intriguing and the author wonders why the court ac-
cepted the argument by the Commonwealth that the police reasonably believed the fleeing
cocaine dealer fled the scene of a controlled buy only to go into his apartment and immedi-
ately begin smoking marijuana.
43 Shortly after arresting King, police found the original suspect in a different apartment
(across the hall, on the left). King 11, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1859-60 (2011).
44 King v. Commonwealth, 2008 WL697629, at * 1 -2.
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and King subsequently pleaded guilty and was sentenced to ten years
imprisonment. 45 The trial court reasoned that the police smelled marijuana
(creating probable cause), heard movement inside (giving weight to the
argument that the police believed that evidence was being destroyed),
and thus, because probable cause and exigent circumstances existed, a
warrantless entry was justified.'
King appealed the decision to the Kentucky Court of Appeals,
contending that the denial of the suppression motion was erroneous
because the entry and search violated the Fourth Amendment and directly
challenging the trial court's legal finding "because it was unsupported
by probable cause and exigent circumstances. '47 The Kentucky Court of
Appeals applied a de novo review of the trial court's application of the law48
and adopted all of the trial court's findings of fact.
49
The Kentucky Court of Appeals, in an unpublished opinion, held
that because the police were pursuing a suspected cocaine dealer to a
specific apartment building, and because they thought evidence was
being destroyed, the police did not need a warrant.50 This decision was
problematic for several reasons as the court of appeals agreed with the
trial court's decision but disagreed with the lower court's legal analysis.5"
In highlighting these differences, it is worth noting that the trial judge
held that exigent circumstances existed under the destruction of evidence
doctrine coupled with probable cause because of the smell of marijuana.The
court of appeals viewed this as incorrect and reasoned that "[tihe correct
standard ... is whether or not the officers reached a reasonable conclusion
[to enter the left apartment] based on facts known to them at the time
of the forced entry."5 In King's case, the court of appeals reasoned that
police officers could not enter the apartment after smelling marijuana and
knocking on the door to announce themselves on the premise that evidence
was being destroyed because this created the exigency.53 According to the
court, this search was invalid, even if the police had probable cause to
45 Id. at 5-6. Of note, typically a right to appeal in Kentucky is waived when a criminal
defendant pleads guilty. However, in King's case, he pleaded guilty on the condition that he
reserved the right to appeal the evidentiary ruling.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 7.
48 To this application of law, the trial court received absolutely no deference. Id. (citing
Adcock v. Commonwealth, 967 S.W.2d 6, 8 (Ky. i998)).
49 Id. at 8.
50 Id. at 15-i6.
51 Id. at 9 ("Although the trial court's ruling was that the warrantless entry was valid was
correct, we disagree with its legal analysis and now state the correct rule of law.").
52 Id. at 15
53 Id. at 12-13 (citing United States v. Williams, 354 E3d 497, 504-05 (6th Cir. 2003)).
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believe that a crime had been committed.' Ultimately, the court of appeals
reasoned that the particular circumstances of the case plus the fact that the
police did not intentionally try to evade the warrant requirement gave rise
to the entry under the good-faith exception of exigent circumstances.55
The fact that the appeals court affirmed the suppression ruling but
disagreed as to the correct application of the law highlights that the
concept of exigent circumstances can be difficult to apply. Senior Judge
Buckingham, the lone dissenter, opined that the good-faith exception
was not applicable and cautioned against this precedent because it would
extend the good-faith exception to scenarios in which police officers are
not acting under the authority of a search warrant and also to situations
where officers are mistaken as to whether circumstances justify warrantless
entry.56 Judge Buckingham pointed out that applying subjective good-
faith standards was a split legal issue among the circuits and felt that
the Kentucky Court of Appeals was blindly following Sixth Circuit law
"without at least considering the view of the other circuits on this issue."5 7
King's case was appealed to the Kentucky Supreme Court for further
review of whether the entry was lawful under existing legal doctrine.
The Kentucky Supreme Court carefully considered the various doctrinal
components of exigent circumstances before creating and applying a new
two-prong test to evaluate police-created exigent circumstances in King
1. 58 In short, they explicitly combined a two-prong test developed in the
Fifth Circuit with a "reasonably foreseeable" component from Arkansas
case law.59 The Kentucky Supreme Court also cited to the Eighth Circuit,"
saying that the inquiry should be focused on the reasonableness of
investigative tactics that generated the exigency.61 In adopting this test,
the Kentucky Supreme Court observed that "[wlith the exception of the
Second Circuit, these various approaches are similar, and will usually reach
the same result.
62
With this in mind, it is important to consider the case law across the
various circuits and notable state decisions on exigent circumstances
54 Id. at 12 (citing Williams, 354 F.3d at 504-05).
55 Id. at 15.
56 Id. at 22 (Buckingham, J., dissenting).
57 Id. at 23 (Buckingham, J., dissenting). Senior Judge Buckingham also evaluated the
"hot pursuit" doctrine and noted that it did not apply because it requires that the suspect
know that police are pursuing him. Id. The "hot pursuit" issue was considered by the Ken-
tucky Supreme Court and disregarded. The United States Supreme Court declined to review
this issue on certiorari. See Order Granting Certiorari at i, King 11, 13I S.Ct. 1849 (2011) (No.
09-1272).
58 Kingl, 302 S.W.3d 649,652-57 (Ky. 2010).
59 Id. at 656; see also Mann v. State, 161 S.W.3d 826,832 (Ark. 2oo6).
6o United States v. Duchi, 906 F.zd 127 8 (8th Cir. 199o).
61 King I,302 S.W.3 d at 655
62 Id. at 656.
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prior to discerning the interplay between the Kentucky and the United
States Supreme Courts' decisions. This will later serve to underscore the
potential shortcomings in the United States Supreme Court's opinion and
will illustrate a discernible difference between the flow of the doctrinal
components of exigent circumstances as a basis to perceive why the United
States Supreme Court decided to create a binding, objective exigent
circumstances test.
III. CONSIDERING THE SPLIT
A. Exigent Circumstances Acting as a Limitation to Police Action: Subjective
and Objective Approaches Among the Federal Circuit and State Courts
Before King I and King II
Prior to King I, case law on exigent circumstances was still evolving.
The circuits were very different in their approaches and even as recent as
six years before King Hat least one circuit had yet to decide upon a proper
inquiry as to the validity of exigent circumstances and police intent.
63
B. The Federal Circuits
The First and Seventh Circuits used an "unreasonable delay in
obtaining a warrant" standard. In general, this test simply looked at whether
the police officer deliberately avoided or unreasonably delayed obtaining
a warrant. 64 If so, then the entry was invalid. On its face, this test granted
courts the ability to consider the subjective intentions of police officers and
arguably granted judges significant discretion in ruling on entry challenges.
Conversely, the Second Circuit's test prior to King H asked whether police
acted in a manner consistent with the law.65 This test was purely objective
in its approach and did not consider the officer's subjective intentions. 6
This test was the most deferential to police action and restricted the courts'
ability to consider factors outside of objective inquiries-it severely limited
the courts' ability to consider police intentions.
The Sixth Circuit asked whether the police officer unreasonably
delayed obtaining a warrant coupled with whether there was deliberate
63 See United States v. Coles, 437 E3d 361 (3d Cir. 2oo6).
64 See United States v. Rengifo, 858 Fd 8oo (st Cir. 1988) (holding that government
officials who deliberately delay or avoid obtaining a warrant cannot rely on the exigent circum-
stances exception); seealso United States v. Berkwitt, 619 F.zd 649,654 (7 th Cir. i98o) (holding
that because the exigency did not arise from unreasonable delay on apart of the police officers,
a valid exigency existed).
65 United States v. MacDonald, 916 Fad 766, 772 (2d Cir. 199o).
66 Id.
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conduct on the part of the officer to evade the warrant requirement.
6 7
This was similar to the First and Seventh Circuit's approach but with an
added inquiry allowing the court to overtly consider a police officer's bad
faith or conduct. This test presented a middle ground between the First
and Seventh Circuit test with the Second Circuit test. Under this test, a
court could consider objective factors (i.e. the time delay in obtaining a
warrant) with subjective factors of the case (e.g. police officer's intents on
avoiding the warrant requirement).' The D.C. Circuit test was similar to
the Sixth Circuit's in that "[a]s long as police measures are not deliberately
designed to invent exigent circumstances, we will not second-guess their
effectiveness."6 9 The tests in the Ninth and Tenth Circuits followed along
these general lines.7" While the tests in these jurisdictions appeared to be
deferential to police actions, they nonetheless allowed courts to measure
subjective intent.
The Third and Fifth Circuits employed a two-part test.7' This test
clearly originated in the Fifth Circuit and was later adopted by the Third
Circuit.7" The first part of the test was to consider if police-created the
exigency to purposefully evade the warrant requirement and then to
determine whether, even without bad faith, the police action in creating
the exigency was unreasonable to preclude the warrant requirement.73
Under the case law in these circuits, warrantless entry was invalidated if the
officer's actions were considered unreasonable.7 4 This inquiry contained
both subjective and objective components-purposeful police action
(subjective) and unreasonable police action (objective)-and granted a
significant amount of discretion to the courts.
75
67 Ewolski v. City of Brunswick, 287 F.3d 4 9 2, 504 (6th Cit. 2002) (quoting United States
v. Campbell, 261 E3d 628, 633-34 (6th Cir. 2001)) ("[There must be] deliberate conduct on
the part of the police evincing an effort intentionally to evade the warrant requirement" in
order to negate a valid finding of exigent circumstances).
68 See id.
69 United States v. Socey, 846 F.2d 1439, 1449 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
70 See United States v. VonWillie, 59 E3d 922, 926 (9 th Cit. 1995) ("This is not a case
where the government purposely tried to circumvent the requirements of [the knock and an-
nounce statute]."); see also United States v. Carr, 939 F.2d 1442 (ioth Cit. 1991) (holding that
where police officers approached a motel room in which they believed narcotics activity was
occurring, they did not themselves create the exigency even if they expected the exigency (in
this case, destruction of evidence) to occur).
71 See United States v. Coles, 437 F3d 361 (3d Cit. 2oo6); United States v. Gould, 364
E3d 578 (5 th Cir. 2004).
72 The Third Circuit observed that the Second Circuit and Fifth Circuit took opposite
approaches to evaluating exigent circumstances and decided that the Fifth Circuit's test was
the superior approach because it focused on the Fourth Amendment inquiry of reasonable-
ness of police action. See Goles, 437 E3d at 367-70.
73 Gould, 364 E3d at 590.
74 United States v. Rico, 5 1 F3d 495, 502 (5th Cit. 1995).
75 See, e.g., Gould, 364 E3d at 59o; Rico, 51 E3d at 502.
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The Fourth Circuit's case law held that when police officers could
reasonably foresee that their actions would create exigent circumstances
and those actions did in fact create those circumstances, then warrantless
entry under the doctrine was not valid.76 The Eighth Circuit adopted the
test used in the Fourth Circuit.77
C. State Courts
Many states used variations of the different Federal Circuit tests.
Arkansas used a test similar to the Eighth Circuit which inquires generally
if it was reasonably foreseeable that "the investigative tactics employed by
the police would create the exigent circumstances relied upon to justify
warrantless entry," regardless of good faith.78 The answer to addressing
the appropriateness of exigencies, according to Arkansas law, is "how did
those ... circumstances come about? ... This antecedent inquiry-into the
reasonableness and propriety of the investigative tactics that generated the
exigency-is ... the principled way to evaluate whether the officers created
the exigent situation.""
In New Hampshire, the exigent circumstances test of a police-
created exigency was viewed under the totality of the circumstances, and
the court also considered whether there was undue delay in securing a
warrant."0 The Pennsylvania state courts used a similar test in that they
determined whether exigent circumstances existed by an "examination of
all of the surrounding circumstances in a particular case."81 Additionally,
Colorado state courts had three exigent circumstances exceptions for
police and an additional six balancing factors to determine whether a
warrantless intrusion into the home based on exigent circumstances was
reasonable.8" Like the Kentucky Supreme Court's test, these tests address
the reasonableness of the circumstances surrounding police entry. This
allowed courts to consider all relevant circumstances, including objective
and subjective inquires. The scope of these tests is appropriate because
the Fourth Amendment should protect against all unreasonable searches.
The text of the Fourth Amendment does not say that the people shall be
free of "objectively" unreasonable searches; it projects individuals from
76 United States v. Mowatt, 513 F.3d 395, 400-03 (4th Cir. 2oo8).
77 United States v. Duchi, 906 E2d 1278, 1284-85 (8th Cir. 199o).
78 Mann v. State, i61 S.W.3d 826, 834 (Ark. 2oo6) (citing Duchi, 906 E2d at 1278).
79 Id.
8o State v. Sanatana, 586A.2d 77 (N.H. 1991).
81 Commonwealth v. Melendez, 676 A.2d 226, 229 (Pa. 1996) (citing Commonwealth v.
Peterson, 596A.2d 172 (1991)).
8z People v. Aarness, 150 P.3d 1271 (Colo. zoo6).
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all unreasonable searches.83 Even an objectively reasonable search can be
subjectively unreasonable.
IV. KING : A UNANIMOUS KENTUCKY SUPREME COURT DECISION
The Supreme Court of Kentucky granted review to address the issue
of whether exigent circumstances existed in King's case. The Kentucky
Supreme Court accepted all of the circuit court's findings of fact and
reviewed the law under a de novo standard. 4
The Commonwealth relied on the court of appeals' ruling that (1)
entry was justified because of the smell of marijuana and (2) that because
the police heard movement inside, the police could enter to prevent the
destruction of evidence.85 The Kentucky Supreme Court disagreed with
the idea that odor alone was sufficient to justify a warrantless entry
6
and further held that a warrantless entry was not justified by the exigent
circumstances doctrine of "imminent destruction of evidence.""7 Kentucky
cited to United States Supreme Court case law, holding "[w]here there
are exigent circumstances in which police action literally must be 'now or
never' to preserve the evidence of the crime, it is reasonable to permit
action without prior judicial evaluation." 8 This exigency requires probable
cause, in this case, imminent destruction of evidence.89 Because smell was
not enough to justify entry, the Court reasoned that the sounds the police
heard after they had knocked and announced themselves at the door were
the only remaining reason for entering King's home.9
83 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures .... "). It is worth
observing that the Framers' did not write the Fourth Amendment to specify "objectively
unreasonable searches." This restraint on the Fourth Amendment's protection is a beast cre-
ated by the courts.
84 King I, 302 S.W.3d 649,653 (Ky. zoo).
85 Id.
86 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 11-15 (1948). The Kentucky Supreme Court
did recognize a public safety exception, see Bishop v. Commonwealth, 237 S.W.3 d 567 (Ky.
App. 2007) (holding that a meth-like smell created an exigent circumstance due to the inher-
ent dangers in producing meth), but rejected the notion that a public safety issue concerned
the case at hand. Id. at 569. The Court noted that since probable cause existed based on the
smell of marijuana, the police could have gotten a warrant. King1, 302 S.W.3d at 653-54.
87 King 1, 302 S.W.3d at 654.
88 Id. (quoting Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496,505 (1973)).
89 Id. (citing Posey v. Commonwealth, 185 S.W.3d 170, 174 (Ky. 2oo6)).
90 Id. The court questioned whether there was enough "sound" to indicate that evidence
was being destroyed inside but for the "purpose of argument that exigent circumstances ex-
isted" the court assumed that exigent circumstances did exist. Id. at 655. This allowed them
to determine "the more important question of whether police-created their own exigency."
Id. This is important to highlight this because ultimately, the issue that was decided by the
United States Supreme Court was what standard should apply to deciding exigent circum-
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In rejecting the prosecution's second contention (the issue of the police-
created exigency), the Kentucky Supreme Court could have relied on the
first ruling-that the odor of marijuana did not create a justifiable exigency.
If no exigency existed giving rise to the suspicion that a crime was being
committed (smoking marijuana), then entry to prevent the destruction of
evidence would be unjustified because there would be no probable cause
in the first place.9" Surprisingly, the Kentucky Supreme Court took this
opportunity to simply assume that exigent circumstances existed to get to
the argument of bad-faith, subjective entry.9"
To evaluate the police-created exigency, the court adopted a two-part
test.93 The first prong comes from the Fifth Circuit, which asks whether
the officers deliberately created the exigent circumstances to avoid the
warrant requirement (bad-faith).94 The second part comes from Arkansas
and requires a court to "determine whether, regardless of good faith, it
was reasonably foreseeable that the investigative tactics employed by
the police would create the exigent circumstances relied upon to justify
a warrantless entry."95 In short, the court held that any exigency was
stances. If the Kentucky Supreme Court had not "assumed" that an exigent circumstance
existed, then this case would not have been reviewed by the United States Supreme Court.
91 See id. at 655.
92 This is striking considering that the Kentucky Supreme Court did not need to expand
the opinion to cover this idea; the case could have ended by holding that the smell of burn-
ing marijuana did not give rise to warrantless entry but did give rise to probable cause and
the police could therefore have attempted to get prior judicial approval. See Id. at 653-55. In
responding to Petitioners request for cert, Respondents referred to this part of the opinion and
the entire issue as an advisory opinion. See Brief for Respondent, King II, 131 S. Ct. 1849 (201 1)
(No. 09-1272), 2010 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2o69.
93 The Kentucky Supreme Court explained that it is a "well established principle that
police may not rely on an exigent circumstance of their own creation." King I, 302 S.W.3d at
655 (citing United States v. Chambers, 395 F3d 563, 566 (6th Cit. 2005)); United States v.
Duchi, 906 F.2d 1278, 1284 (8th Cir. 199o); United States v. Thompson, 700 E 2d 944, 950 (5th
Circuit 1983). The court noted that this issue of police-created exigencies was a case of first
impression. King!, 302 S.W.3d at 655. In forming the background for its analysis, the court
relied on precedent from the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits. Id. (citing Chambers, 395 F.3 d
at 566; Duchi, 906 F2d at 1284). The issue, according to the Kentucky Supreme Court, was
recognized in Duchi in that police always create exigent circumstances that justify warrantless
entries and arrests. An example plays out like this: Mr. Smith is inside his home breaking the
law. The police knock on the door and announce themselves. Mr. Smith stops breaking the
law because the police are at his home. If the police do not enter the home, the evidence
might disappear so they have to either enter without a warrant or lose the evidence even
though they caused Mr. Smith to stop breaking the law, thus creating the exigency (to prevent
destruction of the evidence).
94 King !, 302 S.W.3d at 656.
95 Mann v. State, 161 S.W.3d 826, 834 (Ark. 2oo6). The author is inclined to believe that
if the Arkansas standard is really any different from the second prong of the Fifth Circuit, that
the difference seems to be semantics, and even if police did not do it in bad faith (whether in
Arkansas or in the Fifth Circuit), were the actions that created the exigency unreasonable so
as to preclude dispensation with the warrant requirement, then it would have been reason-
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police-created and not reasonable and that no "good faith" exception to
the exclusionary rule applied in this case.' This test, containing both a
subjective and objective level of inquiry, granted the court a significant
amount of discretion to consider all relevant facts in determining whether
police entry is unlawful.97 The Attorney General of Kentucky appealed
Hollis King's case to the United States Supreme Court.98
V. KING I BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT
A. Commonwealth's Petition for Certiorari
It is important to consider the context in which King's case came under
review before the United States Supreme Court. Ultimately, King won in
Kentucky. The Attorney General of Kentucky ("Commonwealth") filed
for certiorari before the United States Supreme Court. In its petition for
certiorari, the Commonwealth argued that there were several tests being
used among the circuits to consider whether police have impermissibly
created an exigency" and that these tests were so different that courts
would reach entirely different results even given identical facts.' ° The
Commonwealth applied the various tests to King's case, 1 1 ultimately
arguing that in eight circuits, the Commonwealth would have won whereas
in four circuits, King would have won.'
ably foreseeable that the exigency would occur and also be inherently in bad faith. For further
consideration of this issue, see KingI, 302 S.W.3d at 655-56 (citing United States v. Gould, 364
F3d 578, 590 (5th Cir. 2004)).
96 Kingl, 302 S.W.3d at 651.
97 The Court held the idea of a good-faith search exception deals only with warrants that
are invalidated for lack of probable cause and not to warrantless entries. Id. at 657. This type of
search was established in the 198os. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
98 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 34, at 20.
99 Id.
oo Id. This is interesting considering that the legal interpretations of the various tests by
Petitioner are completely different then the legal interpretations of the tests by the Justices
of the Kentucky Supreme Court in King L The Kentucky Supreme Court explicitly said that
with the exception of the Second Circuit, the results were the same and the evidence would
have been suppressed in every circuit except for the Second Circuit, whereas Petitioner ar-
gued and concluded in the petition for certiorari that the results would have yielded drasti-
cally different results in most circuits.
ioi Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 34, at 20-26. This is particularly intriguing
to the author. The Petitioner essentially played the role of the judge in every circuit across the
nation and told the Supreme Court how the issue of evidence suppression would end up. An
interesting tactic but so clearly at odds with the Kentucky Supreme Court opinion, one won-
ders how seriously the United States Supreme Court considered the argument. Obviously, it
was convincing enough to merit a grant of review.
102 Id. at 22-23. Under the Fifth and Seventh Circuit's jurisprudence, the Common-
wealth argued King would have lost the case on the ground that the police had no time to
obtain a search warrant (so no unreasonable delay) because they thought they were pursuing
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The Commonwealth asked the Court to consider "whether police can
impermissibly create exigent circumstances and, if so, to acknowledge and
resolve the current conflict among the circuits, and set forth an effective
and simple test."' 3 Finally, the Commonwealth asked the Court to adopt
the test employed in the Second Circuit (not surprisingly, the test that
grants police the most deference-a purely objective level of inquiry).1°4
a suspect who knew he was being chased by the officers. Id. at 20-22. Petitioner also argued
that the Commonwealth would have won the suppression hearing under the test used by the
Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits. Id. at 21 (citing Ewolski v. City of Bruns-
wick, 287 F3d 492, 504 (6th Cir. 2002); United States v. VonWillie, 59 F3d 922, 926 (9th Cir.
1995); United States v. Carr, 939 F.zd 1442 (ioth Cir. i99i); United States v. Tobin, 923 E2d
15o6 (i ith Cir. I991)). Petitioner reasoned that, like the Fifth and Seventh Circuit's stance on
exigent circumstances, these circuits consider the unreasonable delay factor but also "look for
deliberate conduct in an effort to purposefully evade the warrant requirement." Id. at 21 (cit-
ing Ewolski, 287 E3d at 504; VonWillie, 59 F3d at 926; CaM 939 Ed 1442; Tobin, 923 F.2d 15o6).
In addition, petitioner argued that the Commonwealth would have won in the Second Circuit
on the grounds that the police did not act illegally and therefore, did not create the exigency.
Id. at 21 (citing United States v. MacDonald, 916 E2d 766, 772 (2d Cir. 199o)). This is interest-
ing because at issue in the entire case was whether the police violated or did not violate the
Fourth Amendment (i.e. whether they acted legally or illegally). Within this argument and
applying the second circuit's test, undoubtedly, Petitioner makes a large assumption.
In contrast, Petitioner theorized that King would have prevailed using the Third and
Fifth Circuit's test and also under the Fourth and Eighth Circuit's test, respectively. Id. at
2 1. Petitioner noted that, like the Kentucky Supreme Court, the Fifth and Eighth Circuits
look to the foreseeability of police actions. Id. at 21-22 (citing United States v. Mowatt, 513
F3d 395 (4th Cir. 2008); United States v. Duchi, 906 Ezd 1278 (8th Cir. I99O)). No further
explanation on how King would have won under the foreseeability argument was provided by
Petitioner's brief. King would have prevailed under the Fourth and Eighth Circuit's doctrine
because these courts consider whether the police acted in bad faith, based on the subjective
intentions of the police officers and whether they created the exigency by knocking on the
door on purpose. Id. at 22. So because they knocked on the door after they smelled marijuana
and entered on the premise that evidence was being destroyed, the police effectively created
their own exigency and the entry would not have been lawful within these circuits, according
to Petitioner.
103 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 34, at 23.
104 Id. at 23-24. It is worth noting that what Petitioner represented as the best test is the
test that gives the most discretion to police officers. See King!, 302 S.W.3d 649,656 (Ky. 2010)
(noting that the Second Circuit gives the most deference to law enforcement). An amicus brief
was filed on behalf of the petitioner. The amid was composed of groups including Americans
for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc. (a non-profit organization that has filed over too amicus
briefs before the Supreme Court). Not suprisingly, the amid supported a purely objective test,
which they labeled a "totality of the circumstances test." Amicus Brief Supporting Petition-
ers, King!H, 131 S. Ct. 1849 (2011) (No. 09-1272), 2010 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs, LEXIS 2098. This,
according to the amid, "would look at the totality of the circumstances to determine whether
officers' warrantless entries ... pursuant to exigent circumstances is proper under the Fourth
Amendment." Id. at 6. In support, the amid argued that subjective tests "reward illegal action
in response to a lawful knock on the door by police." Id. at 5. The amid stated that courts have
adopted this rule to negate the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement.
Id. The amid noted that the test for probable cause does not include subjectivity. Id. at ii
(citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 8o6, 818 (1996)) ("Subjective intentions play no role
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B. Response to Petitioner
King' 5 contended that the Kentucky Supreme Court assumed that
exigent circumstances existed to issue an advisory opinion on the proper
test for evaluating created-exigency cases and cautioned the United
States Supreme Court against granting cert.116 King argued that the Court
of Appeals applied the same "totality of the circumstances test" that the
amici asked the United States Supreme Court to adopt.1"7 King cautioned
against reversing King I because if moving around inside a home gives
police probable cause to believe that evidence is being destroyed," 8
then an exigency is always created that police can rely on for home
entry.10 9 Furthermore, King emphasized that the touchstone of the Fourth
Amendment is "reasonableness" which is inherently a fact intensive,
amorphous concept. °
VI. NOT READING THEIR MINDS: THE OBJECTIVE VIEW ADOPTED BY THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
A. King II Before the United States Supreme Court
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider "when
does lawful police action impermissibly 'create' exigent circumstances
which preclude warrantless entry; and which of the five tests currently
being used by the United States Courts of Appeals is proper to determine
when impermissibly created exigent circumstances exist?""' In relating
in ordinary probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis."). Even though the amici couched
their test in different terms, the objective nature of the test is the same as the test used in the
Second Circuit.
1o5 Respondent, the Department of Public Advocacy, is a Commonwealth-wide organi-
zation representing indigent Kentucky residents.
io6 Brief for Respondent, supra note 92, at 2.
107 Id. at 5; see also Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2oo6). This case was reviewed
by the Supreme Court to consider and resolve the "differences among state courts and the
Courts of Appeals concerning the appropriate standard governing warrantless entry by law
enforcement in an emergency situation. Id. at 402. The Supreme Court held that police action
is "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment "regardless of the individual officer's state of
mind, as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify the action." Id. at 404. There-
fore, this test is technically already binding on the courts.
io8 Courts presume that a knock and announce procedure done by police will be fol-
lowed by sounds of movement inside the residence. See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586,
594 (2oo6) (The knock and announce rule "assures the opportunity to collect oneself before
opening the door.").
109 Brief for Respondent, supra note 92, at i i.
1io Id. at i9.
i i i Order Granting Certiorari, supra note 57, at I; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra
note 34, at 2.
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the procedural record,11 the United States Supreme Court said that the
Kentucky Supreme Court reversed the lower courts by assuming exigent
circumstances existed and questioning whether the sounds of a person
moving were sufficient to establish that evidence was being destroyed. The
Court also related that Kentucky then applied a two prong test inquiring
first into bad faith by the police to avoid the warrant requirement and
second, that absent bad faith, exigent circumstances do not apply when
police can reasonably foresee their investigative tactics would create the
exigency.'13
B. King Loses Crown
In its analysis, the United States Supreme Court carefully worked
through a selective history of exigent circumstances, reasonableness, and
police action." 4 The Court identified the fact that the circuits were split
on what test to apply when evaluating the "reasonableness of the exigent
circumstances.""' The Court said the judiciary requires more than just
proof of a fear of the detection, because, as stated by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, "in some sense, police always create
112 Author's note: The United States Supreme Court said that King plead guilty and
was sentenced to i i years while the Kentucky Court of Appeals had in the record that he was
sentenced to iO years.
113 King l, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1855 (2o I) (quoting King 1, 302 S.W.3d 649, 657 (Ky. 2010)).
To provide more context, the United States Supreme Court first addressed the decision of the
Kentucky Court of Appeals and the Kentucky Circuit Court. They noted that the Kentucky
Circuit Court concluded that probable cause existed to allow the officers to investigate the
marijuana smell and that knocking on the door and announcing themselves was proper to
await a response or consensual entry. Id. at 1855. Further, the United States Supreme Court
noted that the court of appeals held that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry
"because there was no response at all to the knocking and because [the police officer] heard
movement in the apartment which he reasonably concluded were persons in the act of de-
stroying evidence, particularly narcotics because of the smell." Id.(quoting King , 302 S.W.3d
at 657). Then, the United States Supreme Court stated that the court of appeals held that,
because the police did not create the exigency by deliberately avoiding the warrant require-
ment, exigent circumstances existed. Id. (summarizing King v. Commonwealth, No. 2006-
CA-ooo33-MR, 2oo8 Ky. App. Unpub LEXIS 131 (Ky. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2008)).
114 King H, 131 S. Ct. at 1856 (citing Brigham City v. Stuart 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2oo6))
(noting that search and seizures without a warrant are presumptively invalid with respect to
the 4th amendment); Michigan v. Fisher, 130 S. Ct. 546 (2009) (stating that the presumption
of invalid searches may be overcome if there is reasonableness); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S.
385,394 (1978) (holding that the exigent circumstances doctrine is an exception to the warrant
requirement (as long as it is objectively reasonable)).
15 King!!, 131 S. Ct. at 1857 (citing United States v. Chambers, 395 F3d 563, 566 (6th
Cir. 2005) (observing that lower courts exception to the exception of the "police-created exi-
gency" doctrine that police may not rely on the need to prevent destruction of evidence when
the exigency was "created" or "manufactured" by the conduct of the police.").
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the exigent circumstances.""' 6 The solution provided by the United States
Supreme Court proved troubling: "The answer to the question before us
is that the exigent circumstances rule justifies a warrantless search when
the conduct of the police preceding the exigency is reasonable in the same
sense."" 7 The Court "clarified" by adding that if police do not create the
exigency by engaging or threatening to engage in activity that violates the
Fourth Amendment, then warrantless entry to prevent the destruction
of evidence is reasonable and will be constitutional. 18 This provided no
direction to the lower courts other than telling them to go to the text of the
Fourth Amendment-which is invariably the same text from which case
law allowing subjective and objective inquiries evolved.
C. One Test to Rule Them All
The United State Supreme Court turned down Kentucky's newly
minted test because they disagreed with the bad faith component.'
Bad faith, according to the high Court, is irrelevant to the extent that
police conduct immediately preceding an exigency is reasonable. 2 ' Such
"reasonableness" justifies warrantless entry.2' Kentucky asked whether
the police "deliberately created the exigent circumstances with the bad-
faith intent to avoid the warrant requirement" and this level of subjectivity,
according to the United States Supreme Court, was inconsistent with
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. At this juncture, the United States
Supreme Court overruled and killed the "bad faith" component to all
tests.
22
The United States Supreme Court then overruled all "reasonably
foreseeable" tests by stating that this line of reasoning is too subjective in
nature and too unpredictable.'23 Then, the Court overruled the "probable
cause and time to secure a warrant"'124 factor by stating that this approach
"unjustifiably interferes with legitimate law enforcement strategies"
116 Id. at 1857 (quoting United States v. Duchi, 906 F2d 1284 (8th Cit. 199o)).
117 Id. at 1858.
i18 Id.
119 Id. at 1859 ("[The bad faith inquiry] is fundamentally inconsistent with our Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence.").
120 Id.
121 Id. The Supreme Court recognized a similar test used in the Ninth Circuit. See Unit-
ed States v. MacDonald, 916 F.zd 766, 772 (199o) (stating that law enforcement officers do
not impermissibly create exigent circumstances when they act in an entirely lawful manner).
122 King 11, 131 S. Ct. at 1859.
123 Id. Of note, the reasonably foreseeable test simply inquires whether it was foresee-
able that the tactics employed by the police would create the exigency in which they then rely
to enter a home. See Mann v. State, 161 S.W.3 d 826, 826-30 (Ark. 2006).
124 King 11, 131 S. Ct. at i86o.
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because there are many reasons that officers may choose to wait to obtain a
warrant and then suddenly not have time to obtain one."2 5
The Court stated that knocking on the door and calling out "police"
is not a police-created exigency even if the police did not have probable
cause.1 16 With this new standard, it seems hard to imagine when police
action will ever rise to the level of a police-created exigency. Finally, the
United States Supreme Court overruled the "standard or good investigative
tactics" doctrine."2 7 In a handful of paragraphs, the United States Supreme
Court wiped out decades of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that had
protected individual rights and limited police power. The Court remanded
King's case back to the Kentucky Supreme Court to determine if exigent
circumstances existed in the first place."2 '
D. Ginsburg: Saving King?
Justice Ginsburg alone dissented in King II but wrote a powerfully
compelling cautionary oration against the seemingly unbridled power the
majority opinion conferred upon police officers.1 9 Ginsburg was concerned
with the level of discretion that police officers enjoy unchecked by any
125 Here is a brief example to clarify: a police officer may ask to speak with residents of
a home concerning some type of crime. At this point, he may not have enough information or
probable cause to make an arrest. After speaking with an individual, something might happen,
causing a suspect to flee or hide. At this point, an exigency is created to allow the officer to
enter the home or chase the suspect (under the hot pursuit doctrine) at which time he does
not have time to get a warrant.
i6 King 11, 131 S. Ct. at 1859. The author finds it interesting that the court opined that
the police knocking on the door and calling out "police" during a lawful investigation of a con-
trolled buy was not a police-created exigency even if the police do not have probable cause as
to that residence. If this is not a police-created exigency, it would seem that courts would be
hard pressed to find any police-created exigencies.
127 Id. at 1861.
128 Id. at 1863 (citing Kirk v. Louisiana, 536 U.S. 635, 638 (2002)) (reversing King I,
but holding that "[any question about whether an exigency actually existed is better ad-
dressed by the Kentucky Supreme Court on remand"). On remand to the Kentucky Supreme
Court, the Court concluded that the Commonwealth did not show that evidence was going
to be destroyed and held that entry into Hollis King's apartment was unreasonable. King v.
Commonwealth, No. aoo8-SC-oooa74-DG, 2012 WL 1450081, - S.W.3d - (Ky. 2012). King's
conviction was overturned. Interestingly, the Kentucky Supreme Court explained that "[t]
he police officers' subjective belief that evidence was being (or about to be) destroyed is
not supported by the record .... " Id. at *3. The fact that the Kentucky Supreme Court even
considered the police officers' subjective intent is contrary to King Iis holding. This further
illustrates that King H served only to further confuse the exigent circumstances doctrine and
highlights courts' hesitancies to turn away from subjective inquiries when facing a Fourth
Amendment issue.
129 Ginsburg's dissent started off powerfully: "In lieu of presenting their evidence to a
neutral magistrate, police officers may now knock, listen, then break the door down .... King
11, 131 S. Ct. at 1864 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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subjective inquiry. 13It is readily apparent, however, that her concerns were
drowned by a vote of eight in favor of a purely objective standard.
VII. THE REIGN OF KiNG H
A. The Circuits in the Wake of King II
To no surprise, the Second Circuit has quickly picked up the reasoning
in King II, since this circuit's case law-more so than any other circuit and
largely the stand alone-closely mirrors the test set forth in King 11. 3'
The Third Circuit, represented by the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, has quoted King II in stating that
"exigent circumstances does not apply when the exigency is created or
manufactured by the conduct of the police" but rather, only applies "when
the police do not gain entry to premises by means of an actual or threatened
violation of the Fourth Amendment."'
132
District courts sitting in the Fourth Circuit seem reluctant to move away
from the "totality of the circumstances test" and, while citing to KingII and
the objective standard, consider both a particularized and objective basis
for police action.'33 However, case law has made clear that the "totality of
the circumstances test" should be measured in objective terms, although
there is some indication that courts do not all agree on what "objective"
within the reasonableness standard is.'
34
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has
recognized that King II no longer allows a court to inquire into whether a
claim of exigent circumstances by police was done to bypass the warrant
130 Id.
131 See United States v. Simmons, 66I F3d 157 (2dCir. 2oi) (citing Kingll, 131 S. Ct.at
I856) (holding that in determining reasonableness, the test is purely objective).
132 Ernay v. Swatski, No. 10-t035, 201I U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8o814 (E.D. Pa. July 22, 2011)
(quoting King 11, 131 S. Ct. at 1862).
133 United States v. Wallace, 811 E Supp. 2d 1265, 1272 (S.D.W. Va. 2011) (citing King
11, 131 S. Ct. at 1859) (holding that a Fourth Amendment analysis is purely objective); see also
United States v. Starling, No. 3:1 I-cr-30, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1301i19 (N.D.W. Va. Oct. 14,
2011 ) (citing United States v. Aryizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002)).
134 Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996). However, one must question whether
sneaking in a "particularized" basis into the totality of circumstances test adds to the "objec-
tive" standard by allowing courts to delve more deeply into specific police action. This author
believes that it does. See United States v. Willis, 443 Fed. Appx. 8o6, 8o8 (4th Cit. 2011) (citing
Kingll, 131 S. Ct. at 1856) ("Courts have recognized a variety of exigent circumstances justify-
ing a warrantless entry into a home."). However, the court went on to cite to nine factors that
allowed warrantless entry including weighing the fact that the police officers delayed their
entry to obtain appropriate protection and that the officers involved in entering "believed im-
mediate entry was necessary." Id. This consideration seems close to the factor of considering
police intent, which was a factor almost entirely disregarded as inappropriate under King I
(considering bad faith intent). See King I, 131 S. Ct. at 1859.
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requirement or whether it was reasonably foreseeable that the police action
would cause some type of exigent circumstance. In United States v. Aguirre,
the Fifth Circuit even noted that prior to King II, the Fifth Circuit court
would have considered the particular police action in the case violative of
the Fourth Amendment.'35 The court has categorized King II as a decision
that "narrowed the police-created exigency doctrine adopted by this and
other circuits."'36 Looking to King II, the Fifth Circuit's new standard is
one that does allow police-created exigencies as long as "the police did not
create the exigency by engaging or threatening to engage in conduct that
violates the Fourth Amendment."'1
37
Thus far, at least one district court in the Sixth Circuit has interpreted
King H in a slightly different light. Prior to King II, the Sixth Circuit had a
subjective measure regarding police-created exigencies. Now, to comply
with King II, the Sixth Circuit focuses on police action "up until the time
they enter the house."'13 They have continued by holding that "[a]ny
warrantless entry based on exigent circumstances must.., be supported
by a genuine exigency."'13' However, it appears that the Sixth Circuit will
still consider whether a police officer deliberately attempted to avoid the
warrant requirement. 14' This seems contrary to King IL This is especially
troubling considering that the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit, in light of King II, has noted that consideration of bad-faith efforts
on the part of police has been taken out of the exigency doctrine.1
4'
The Arkansas Supreme Court has recognized that King H expressly
abrogated the "reasonably foreseeable" test because it produced an
"unacceptable degree of unpredictability."'4 However, the court noted
that as a matter of Arkansas state constitutional law, it will continue to
135 United States v. Aguirre, 664 E3d. 606, 611 (5 th Cir. zoi) ("This inquiry [of reason-
able foreseeability] is no longer proper after the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849 (2o I)."). The court observed that the following cases, setting
forth subjective inquiries were overruled by King : See, e.g., United States v. Gomez-Moreno,
479 E3d 350, 356-57 (5th Cir. 2007); United States v. Maldonado, 472 F3d 388, 396 (Sth Cir.
2oo6); United States v. Vega, 221 F3d 789, 797 (5th Cir. 2000); United States v. Richard, 994
E2d 244, 248-49 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Munoz-Guerra, 788 E2d 295, 298 (5th Cit.
1986).
136 United States v. Aguirre, 664 F.3d 606 (5th Cir. 2011).
137 Id. at6II n. 13 (citing Kingll, 131 S. Ct. at 1858).
138 Harsh v. City of Franklin, No. C-I-O7-874, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102678, at *1
(S.D. Ohio Sept. 12, 2oi I)
139 Id. at *12 (citing Kingll, 131 S. Ct. at 1862).
140 United States v. Franklin, No. 5:1 I-CR- 4 2-KKC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135759, at
*18 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 31, 2011) (quoting Ewolski v. City of Brunswick, 287 F 3 d 492,504 (6th Cir.
2002)) ("[A] police-created exigent circumstance exists only where the police have engaged
in "deliberate conduct.., evincing an effort intentionally to evade the warrant requirement.").
141 In United States v. Hendrix, 664 E3 d 1334 (ioth Cir. 2011), the Tenth Circuit recog-
nized that it could no longer evaluate bad faith actions by the police because of King IL
142 State v. Brewster, 2011 Ark. 530, 530 (Ark. 2011) (citing King 11, 131 S. Ct. at 1859).
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follow the reasonably foreseeable test.'43 This makes clear that King II
will not be blindly followed and accepted by courts where additional state
constitutional safeguards set higher protections for individual privacy and
search and seizure limitations.
In sum, this new test, left untried by the Supreme Court, has already
been used in juxtaposed ways: the Ninth Circuit, represented by the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, has
viewed King H as an objectively reasonable standard but then applied a
subjective standard.'" The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit has cited King II in an objective standard by saying "[tlhe Fourth
Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable seizures includes the right
to be free of seizures effectuated by excessive force. . . . Whether an
officer has used excessive force is analyzed under a standard of objective
reasonableness."' 145 The Fourth Circuit continued in Purnel'46 by saying
that a subjective approach for determining the reasonableness of a police
officer's actions has repeatedly been rejected and that they shall give no
regard to a police officer's underlying intent or motivation. 147 Some courts
are focusing on the "reasonableness" standard set forth in King I but there
remains a question as to how objective objectivity really is and a split is
already occurring even though King I is a recently minted decision.
B. The Palpable Effect of King II
To understand the effect of KingII, consider United States v. Hall. 148 In
Hall, the defendant argued that because the police covered the peephole
when they knocked on his door, the police-created the exigency because
the police made it likely that the defendant would approach the door
armed. Under the reasonably foreseeable test, this argument was proper
and evidence suppression was likely. However, as noted by the court in
143 Id. at 530 (citing State v. Brown, I56 S.W. 3 d 722 (2004) (noting that the court is not
bound by federal interpretation of the Fourth Amendment when the Arkansas Constitution
also provides safeguards against search and seizure); see also Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769
(2001) (holding that a state is free to impose greater restrictions on police activity than those
imposed under federal constitutional restraints including United States Supreme Court deci-
sions).
144 United States v. Neal, No. 1 i-o28 Section: R(3), 20i I U.S. Dist. LEXIS IIO6io, at
*9 (E.D. La. Sept. 28,2ot 1) (quoting King!!, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (2oil) ("The 'presump-
tion may be overcome in some circumstances because the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth
Amendment is reasonableness."').
145 Henry v. Purnell, 652 F 3d 524, 531 (4th Cir. 2oiI) (citing Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372,
381 (2007)) (citations omitted).
146 Id. at 526.
147 Id. at 531 (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 336, 397 (1989)).
148 United States v. Hall, No. i I-6oi69-CR-Martinez-McAliley, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
133522 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 6, 2011).
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Hall, King II forecloses this argument. 149 Because of King II, police have
significantly more discretion and Hall illustrates where individuals truly
lose out.
There is some thought that the circuits will need time to adjust to and
incorporate the holding of King H into their case law.' This is especially
important considering the impact of this decision on criminal defense and
the right to adequate council.'' There is also the issue of when police
conduct might go too far and whether the exigent circumstances doctrine
might apply if police threaten to enter a residence without permission. 5 '
VIII. THE PROBLEM WITH KING II: PROPOSAL
A. King II is an Unworkable Standard, Restricting Flexibility in
Evidence Suppression Hearings
King II is troublesome because it did not truly solve the conflict in law
among the courts. It is too inflexible to be properly tailored to each individual
case, and a wholly objective standard-while proper in many areas of the
law-is not always appropriate to gauge whether a search is unreasonable.
The Supreme Court's unbending standard as defined in King II sets forth
an unworkable test to derive an unreasonable solution from an inquiry that
seems to be inherently subjective."3 To delve into the subjective intent
of a police officer is not to reward criminal activity in a home but rather to
I49 Id. at "9-IO.
I5o Reply Brief for Petitioner at io, Alvis v. Espinosa, 132 S. Ct. IO89 (2012) (No. I1-84),
2oI U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2579 (U.S. 2011) (pointing out that there the ruling in KingH
may need to "percolate" among the circuits.).
151 See 14 JOSEPH A. GRAsso, JR. & CHRISTINE M. McEvov, SUPPRESSION MATTERS UNDER
MASSACHUSETTS LAW § 14-I (201 I) (citing King II and explaining that Massachusetts cases
predating King II applied a reasonable foreseeability test and bad-faith inquiries) ("What
amounts to an exigency... and what conduct the police may permissibly engage in without
being deemed to have manufactured the exigency is likely to be considerably more nuanced
and awaits case development.").
152 See 22 MICHAEL G. MILLMAN ET AL., CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE PRACTICE § 22.03
(201 I) (noting that the United States Supreme Court, in Kingll, expressly left open the ques-
tion of "whether the exigent circumstances doctrine applies when the police threaten to enter
without permission unless they are admitted into the resident").
153 SeeWelsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740,749-50 (I984) ("[Tlhe police bear a heavy bur-
den when attempting to demonstrate an urgent need that might justify warrantless searches or
arrests .... Before agents of the government may invade the sanctity of the home, the burden
is on the government to demonstrate exigent circumstances that overcome the presumption
of unreasonableness that attaches to all warrantless home entries.") (internal citations omit-
ted); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573,586 (1980) ("[It is] a basic principle of Fourth Amend-
ment law that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively un-
reasonable.").
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protect individual privacy.' In fact, the basis of the exclusionary rule is to
deter police misconduct-actions police officers take to intentionally avoid
the warrant requirement.155 Unfortunately, considering whether police
officers deliberately created an exigent circumstance to bypass the warrant
requirement is no longer valid after King JJ.156
B. Where King IIs Limits Should Be
In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg reminds us that unwarranted entries
into a home bear heightened scrutiny, are unreasonable per se, and that the
warrant requirement "ranks among the fundamental distinctions between
our form of government, where officers are under the law, and the police-
state where they are the law." '157 "The police bear a heavy burden ... when
attempting to demonstrate an urgent need that might justify warrantless
searches."l"' Inherent in Ginsburg's observations-that police must prove
a compelling interest-is the necessity to retain an approach that is not
entirely objective. To not consider bad-faith action on the part of the police
so long as it can be deemed "objectively reasonable" does not properly
protect one of our most fundamental individual rights. If we do not inquire
why the police officer decided to enter the home and how compelling the
interest was in accordance with not only the facts of the case but also what
the police officer specifically considered the exigent reason, then we have
stopped our inquiry far too short-at a threshold which falls somewhere
below the scrutiny that constitutional questions deserve. For "[in no
quarter does the Fourth Amendment apply with greater force than in our
homes, our most private space."' 5 9
C. Is the Test Still the Totality of the Circumstances and Is There Any Room
for Subjectivity?
Irrespective of an officer's subjective intentions, because the Fourth
Amendment states that people are free from unreasonable searches, the
154 Compare Amicus Brief Supporting Petitioners, supra note 104, at s (arguing that sub-
jective tests "reward illegal action"), with Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,351 (1967) ("The
Fourth Amendment protects people...."), Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476,481 (1965) (stating
that the Fourth Amendment is designed to protect), and United States v. Vega, 221 F3d 789,
798 (5th Cir. 2ooo) (holding that a privacy is subjective).
155 SeeWhren v. United States, 517 U.S. 8o6, 812 (1996). See also Donald L. Dorenberg,
The Right of the People: Reconciling Collective and Individual Interests Under the Fourth Amendment,
S8 N.Y.U. L. REV. 259, 282 (1983).
i56 United States v. Aguirre, 664 E3d 606 (5th Cir. 2o 1).
157 King It, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1864 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
I58 Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Welsh, 446 U.S. at 749-50).
i59 Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 115 (zoo6); Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 99
(1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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"ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 'reasonableness."' 16 This
standard is determined by "look[ing] at the 'totality of the circumstances'
of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a 'particularized
and objective basis' for suspecting legal wrongdoing.' '16 Any warrantless
entry based on exigent circumstances must, of course, be supported by a
genuine exigency.6 This dilemma presupposes the idea, and the Supreme
Court seems to assume, that it is possible to determine whether a genuine
exigency existed without considering what the officers believed at the time
of the entry. Deliberate police action to skirt the warrant requirement should
not stand to be rewarded as is currently being done under King 1".163 This
highlights the fact that a proper test cannot be purely objective insofar as
it will invariably remove the ability of a defendant in a suppression hearing
to argue that there was some type of maligned subjective intent on the part
of the police officer. Having highlighted the shortcomings of this doctrine
and various courts' hesitancy to follow it, it is important to consider where
the case law seems to be going and how this conflict can be resolved.
The Sixth Circuit, relying on King II, observed that an objective test is
the default type of legal test and that law enforcement is best governed by
objective standards rather than delving into the subjective state of mind
of the officer."6 However, simply because there is a default standard does
not necessarily mean it is the most appropriate in every circumstance.'65
While an "objective standard" is not new to the law, 16 it seems misplaced
in the context of search and seizure. Measuring a search can contain both
a subjective and objective component, 167 and by extension, the Fourth
Amendment should protect privacy by questioning the intent of those
performing the search. 68 Courts have been directed to determine "whether
the officers' actions are 'objectively reasonable' in light of the facts
16o United States v. Starling, No. 3:1 I--cr-30, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130119 (N.D.W. Va.
Oct. 14, 201 1) (quoting KinglI, 131 S. Ct. at 1856).
161 United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002).
162 Brigham City v.Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 406 (2oo6); Harsh v. City of Franklin, No. C-1-
07-874, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102678, at *12 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 12, 2011) (citing King II, 131
S. Ct. at 1862).
163 King H, 131 S. Ct. at 1864 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
164 Stricker v. Cambridge Twp., No. 10-14424, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84246, at *35 n.5
(E.D. Mich. Aug. 1, 201 1) (quoting King 11, 131 S. Ct. at 1862) ("The reasons for looking to
objective factors, rather than subjective intent, are clear. Legal tests on reasonableness are
generally objective....").
j65 See Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931) ("There is no
formula for determining reasonableness. Each case is to be decided on its own facts and cir-
cumstances.").
166 See Brown v. Kendall, 6o Mass. 292 (185o) (explaining the concept of the "reasonable
person" in a torts case).
167 See United States v. Brown, 510 E3 d 57, 65 (1st Cir. 2001).
168 See King 1, 302 S.W.3d 649,652-57 (Ky. 20 1 o).
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and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying
intent or motivation." 169 In considering whether an officer used reasonable
force, a court must focus on the moment that the force is employed.170 But
how can this be accomplished by a purely objective standard? 17t At least
four of the circuits decided, prior to King II, that some type of subjective
measure was necessary when evaluating police action in light of the Fourth
Amendment.17 Additionally, the Supreme Court's historical decisions
on the existence of warrantless intrusions have always been very fact
intensive.173 This raises the issue of how far a court can delve into the facts
of a case until they have gone too far so as to reveal the subjective intent of
the police action.'74 Still, the Supreme Court has admittedly been unwilling
to allow for a subjective measure in many situations of criminal law.17s
169 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989).
17o Elliott v. Leavitt, 99 E3d 640,643 (4th Cir. 1996).
171 See United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 45 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating
that courts should consider whether "police conduct was justifiable or was solely an attempt
to circumvent the warrant requirement").
172 See United States v. Mowatt, 513 E3d 395 (4 th Cir. 2008) (using a reasonably fore-
seeable, subjective approach); United States v. Coles, 437 F3d 361,367-70 (3d Cit. 2oo6) (sup-
porting the idea that focusing on the reasonableness of police action is an important part of
evaluating exigent circumstances); Ewolski v. City of Brunswick, 287 E3d 492 (6th Cir. 2002)
(holding that deliberate conduct on the part of the police to evade that warrant requirements
negates a valid exigency); United States v. Rengifo, 858 E2d 800 (ist Cir. 1988) (holding that
police cannot deliberately avoid a warrant by relying on exigent circumstances).
173 Case law reveals that pre-King II, the United States Supreme Court considered
detailed information about why a warrantless search was conducted. This seems to have an
inherent element of subjectivity. See, e.g., Michigan v. Fisher, 130 S. Ct. 546, 547 (2009) (hold-
ing in part that warrantless entry was justified to render emergency aid because police found
property damage that they believed to be recent); Brigham City v.Stuart, 547 U.S. 398,400-02
(2oo6) (holding that warrantless entry was justified to render emergency aid because police
heard screaming and also saw a child hit an adult in the face after which the adult tried to sub-
due the child through a physical altercation that the officers believed to be excessive force);
Santana, 427 U.S. at 40-41 (holding that warrantless entry was justified to prevent destruction
of evidence where the police saw the defendant drop what appeared to them to be drugs onto
the floor while going inside); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 297 (1967) (holding that a war-
rantless entry was justified because a witness identified a robber at a specific residence and
told the police); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 758-759 (1966) (holding that taking
defendant's blood without a warrant was lawful because the police believed defendant to be
drunk because they smelled liquor on his breath and his eyes were bloodshot and glassy in
appearance and he had been involved in an automobile accident.).
174 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1968); see also Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740,
751 (1984) (quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 459-460 (1948) (Jackson, J.,
concurring)) (holding that the "method of law enforcement" must be commensurate with the
government's interests).
175 See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 138 (199o) (holding that "evenhanded law
enforcement is best achieved by the application of objective standards of conduct, rather than
standards that depend upon the subjective state of mind of the officer"); Maryland v. Macon,
472 U.S. 463, 471 (I985) (stating that a controlled buy must be viewed objectively and not
"retrospectively transformed into a warrantless seizure by virtue of the officer's subjective
2012-2013]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
D. A Subjectively Objective Standard
There are two express requirements of the Fourth Amendment: (1)
all searches and seizures must be reasonable and (2) probable cause must
be properly established in order to secure a warrant which sets out the
authorized search with particularity.'76 Starting with King II, the standard
for police-created exigencies is no longer subjective and can no longer
contain any type of subjective, bad-intent, inquiry. However, this type of
measure does not seem to be an entirely objective test. The Court held
that a proper test would be what is reasonable in the circumstances, giving
one pause to consider whether there is an inherent level of subjectivity
involved in measuring contextual reasonableness.' Unfortunately, inquiry
beyond this "reasonableness" dilemma seems usurped as the high court
forbade lower courts from imposing additional requirements to measure
exigent circumstances. In this case, the Court said that the Kentucky
Supreme Court cannot ask whether officers "deliberately created the
exigent circumstances with the bad faith intent to avoid the warrant
requirement." 17 8 This statement seems contrary to their holding that a
proper test would be to consider what is reasonable in the circumstances. 79
The Kentucky Supreme Court held that police cannot rely on an exigency
if it was reasonably foreseeable that their investigative tactics would create
the exigent circumstances. 180 According to the United State Supreme Court,
reasonable foreseeability is irrelevant, but there has been no explanation
intent"); Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 137 (1978) (holding that an objective standard
is the proper standard for examining a valid warrant for a wiretap in light a pretext challenge);
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 2 18, 234 (1973) (holding that an objective standard is the
proper standard for searches incident to an arrest); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,
466 (197 ) (holding that an officer's motive does not invalidate objectively justifiable behavior
under the Fourth Amendment in relation to the plain view doctrine).
176 See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 584 (1980).
177 For more on this point, consider Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (I996) ("[W]e
have consistently eschewed bright-line rules, instead emphasizing the fact-specific nature
of the reasonableness inquiry."); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357
(I931) ("There is no formula for determining reasonableness. Each case is to be decided on
its own facts and circumstances.").
178 Kingll, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1852 (2oi).
179 See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1193
(I99O) ("[T]he line between constitutional law and constitutional fact is often hazy, as il-
lustrated by the "reasonable issue in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence."). Amar notes that
the plain wording of the Fourth Amendment suggests that determining the reasonableness
of a warrant should be determined by jury members and judicial warrants, because they take
away the reasonableness issue from the jury, should be subject to stricter requirements when
being issued. Id. at 1179. Cf. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Cm. L.
REV. 1175, I 18o-86 (1989) (advocating rules in part because it increases predictability in deci-
sion-making).
i8o King!, 302 S.W.3d 649, 656 (Ky. 2oio).
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why an objective measure could not properly consider this fact. Further,
not allowing this inquiry seems to be in conflict with measuring the
reasonableness of actions within a given context."' s The argument that a
court can no longer question whether it was reasonable for an officer to
create an exigent circumstance just to skirt the warrant requirement should
fall flat on its face, but as the law currently exists, it is proper for courts to
ignore this inquiry.
The Supreme Court said that the proper measure of exigent
circumstances is an objective measure; l s' the standard is whether the facts
known to the officers would support their belief.8 3 In addition, courts have
stated that in determining whether exigent circumstances exist, "[tihe core
question is whether the facts, as they appeared at the moment of entry,
would lead a reasonable, experienced officer to believe that there was an
urgent need to render aid or take action."" This test "is an objective one
that turns on the totality of the circumstances confronting law enforcement
agents in the particular case."'85 In considering these highlighted factors
(for example, what facts support the officer's belief for a warrantless entry,
considering all of the circumstances in each particular case, etc.), some
level of subjective inquiry is appropriate, and even post-King II, courts are
employing various measures under the color of "objectivity."'186 It seems
reasonable to have a standard that could be adapted to address the issue
of bad faith on the part of the police officers in creating and then relying
on an exigent circumstance to perform a warrantless search. It could be
objective in nature ("reasonable police officer") in conjunction with a
specific showing of the compelling interest that forced the police officer to
conduct the warrantless entry. Therefore, it would be objective but more
specifically tailored to ask why the police officer did what he did. This
is a subjectively objective test-similar to the reasonably foreseeable test
still used in some state courts-potentially extending the "particularized"
language of the Fourth Circuit that has survived post-KingII. Is7
181 Consider the "particularity" concept that is being used conjunctively with the "ob-
jective" standard in measuring police-created exigent circumstances currently developing in
the Fourth Circuit post-King I. See United States v. Starling, No. 3:1 I-cr-30, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 1301 19 (N.D.W. Va. Oct. 14,2011).
182 Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2oo6).
183 1-6 DONALD F SAMUEL, ELEVENTH CIRCUIT CRIMINAL HANDBOOK § 131 (201 I).
184 United States v. Klump, 536 E3d 113, 1 17-18 (2d Cir. 2oo8).
185 Klump, 536 F3d at 1 17 (quoting United States v. MacDonald, 916 F2d 766, 769
(1990)).
186 See Cook v. City of Shreveport, No. IO-O8O9, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92544, at *18
(W.D. La. Aug. 18, 201 I) (stating that reasonableness for probable cause under the Fourth
Amendment "exists when the facts and circumstances within the arresting officerst personal
knowledge.., are sufficient to occasion a person of reasonable prudence to believe that an of-
fense has been committed") (emphasis added).
187 See United States v. Starling, No. 3:1 i-cr-30, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130119, at *t I
2012-2013]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
There are rights in the Fourth Amendment that guarantee individual
privacy that are more deserving than a bright-line, objective standard.188
When a fact pattern is unique, as a warrantless entry based on exigent
circumstances certainly is, a subjective approach would best accomplish
the need to evaluate the reasonableness of an entry.'89 In light of the idea
that searches are per se unreasonable and that "whenever practical, [the
police must] obtain advance judicial approval of searches and seizures
through the warrant requirement,"" it would seem that an exception to
such a fundamental right should be narrow and that courts would be very
skeptical in allowing warrantless entries to stand. Undeniably, case law has
weakened the explicit text of the Fourth Amendment and admittedly King
H is one step further in that direction.' 9' But it makes little sense to shorten
the inquiry to objective reasonableness when details about an officer's
motivation and intent in entering a house are easily accessible. There is
an inherent problem in limiting what a court may do when considering
the appropriateness of a search, especially considering that the Supreme
Court has consistently held that it is important to consider the totality
of the circumstances. 19 If the Fourth Amendment really does guarantee
safety against unreasonable searches, then a police officer's intent to
skirt the warrant requirement by creating his own exigent circumstance
seems entirely relevant to a proper test and, in the event of "bad intent,"
should ultimately be considered an unjustified violation of the Fourth
Amendment. My proposal suggests an objective test with some flexibility
to appropriately gauge some level of subjective intent.
(N.D.W. Va. Oct. 14, 201i). Consider also that the judiciary, in other contexts has recognized
the validity of tests that use both objective and subjective measures. See Harris v. Forklift Sys-
tems, Inc., 5 10 U.S. 17 (1993) (using a two prong test with an objective gauge and an indepen-
dent subjective measure in a case concerning discrimination under Title VII), and Ocheltree
v. Scollon Productions, Inc., 335 E3d 325,333 (4th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (same).
188 There are also inherent rights in the Fourth Amendment. See Griswold v. Connecti-
cut, 381 U.S. 479, 483-85 (1965) (explaining that there is an inherent protection of right to
privacy in the Fourth Amendment).
189 SeeWelsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749-50 (1984).
19o Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968).
191 See Kingll, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1864 (ZOl i) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
192 Amar, supra note 178, at 12o6 ("As the Fourth Amendment warrant clause ... make[s]
clear, professional judges acting without Citizen juries can sometimes be part of the problem,
rather than the solution.")
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CONCLUSION
The Fourth Amendment is an essential part of human dignity, privacy,
and autonomy. 93 Homes are an integral and sacred facet of American life,"94
and "[tihe Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to
the house." 9 s Searches and seizures in the home bear heightened scrutiny
and police should bear the burden of demonstrating an urgent need so
compelling that they had to violate a fundamental right.'96 Yet, from this
seemingly unbreakable standard, under the precedent of King II, police
simply need to knock, announce, and listen for movement inside at
which point they can break down the door. 97 The only safeguard now
protecting individual rights is a simple inquiry as to whether the police
acted objectively reasonable. It is disheartening that such a low standard
now exists to overcome such a fundamental, historical right.'98 KingI is the
new standard and unfortunately, until the split develops further and needs
readdressing, King H reigns supreme.
193 Garcia, supra note I2, at Io (noting that there are substantive human rights in the
Fourth Amendment that the United States Supreme Court has recognized).
194 Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 376 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (stating that the
Fourth Amendment not only protects privacy but is also a protector of "conscience and human
dignity and freedom of expression as well").
195 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (i98o).
196 Id. at 585-86.
197 Kingll, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1864 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
198 Payton, 445 U.S at 585 (quoting United States v. U. S. District Court, 407 U.S. 297,
313 (1972)) ("[P]hysical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the
Fourth Amendment is directed.").
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